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Daniel Virgin Irvin
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I.
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Guy Remick dba Wasatch
Towing and the Appellee, Granite Credit Union (hereafter credit union).
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is invoked in this matter pursuant to
§ 78-2a-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1953).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
First Issue: Whether the tow company's failure to provide supporting
evidence prevent itfromasserting factual arguments.
Second Issue: Whether a perfected security interest in a motor vehicle takes
priority over a lien created by a towing company.
Third Issue: Whether a towing company's failure to comply with the
applicable statutes prevents it from asserting a lien for towing and storage against a
lienholder.
Fourth Issue: Whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to
articulate Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is being appealed from a granting of a summary judgment motion.
Following the granting of a summary judgment motion, this Court determines
"only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact."
Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol. 2003 UT 19, P5, 70 P.3d 72.
1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal property - Lien subject to rights of
secured parties.
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow labor upon, any article of
personal property at the request of the owner or other person entitled to possession
thereof shall have a lien upon such article for the reasonable value of the labor
performed and materials furnished and used in making such article or in altering or
repairing the same, and may retain possession thereof until the amount so due is
paid; provided such lien and right to possession shall be subject and subordinate to
the rights and interests of any secured parties in such personal property unless such
secured party has requested such person to make, alter or repair or bestow labor
upon such property.
41-la-601. Lien validity - Security interest.
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2), a lien upon a vehicle, vessel, or
outboard motor, except a lien dependent upon possession, is not valid against the
creditors of an owner acquiring a lien by levy or attachment, or subsequent
purchasers, or encumbrancers without notice until Sections 41-la-602 through 41la-606 have been complied with.
(2) Security interests in inventory consisting in part of vehicles subject to
registration under this chapter, that are held for sale by a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind, shall be perfected under Section 70A-9a-310, except
that buyers in the ordinary course of business, as defined in Section 70A-1-201,
take free of the security interests as provided in Section 70A-9a-320.
41-la-602. Application for original registration.
(1) (a) If a vehicle is of a type subject to registration but has not been registered
and no certificate of title has been issued, or if the vehicle has been registered or
titled in another state or country, the owner shall file an application in the form for
an original registration and issuance of an original certificate of title,
(b) If the vehicle ownership has changed, the owner shall file an application in the
form for an original certificate of title.
(2) Each application shall be accompanied by all applicable taxes and fees under
Part 12, Fee and Tax Requirements.
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41-la-603. Issuance of new certificate of title - Lienholder.
(1) Upon receipt of a title application the division shall file the application, and
when satisfied as to the authenticity of the application, shall issue a new certificate
of title in usual form, giving the name of the owner and a statement of one lien or
encumbrance, if any, certified to the division as existing against the vehicle, vessel,
or outboard motor.
(2) If a certificate of title has been issued, and the same lienholder as shown by the
records of the division only grants additional funds to the same owner as shown by
the records of the division, no further recording is required and no subsequent
certificate of title need be applied for or issued, if the original certificate or valid
duplicate has remained in possession of the lienholder and the lien has not been
released and the certificate has not been delivered to the owner.
41-la-604. Filing effective to give notice of liens.
The filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title under Sections 41-la-602
and 41-la-603 constitute constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against
the vehicle, vessel, and outboard motor to creditors of the owner and to subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers.
41-la-605. Date of constructive notice.
If the documents referred to in Section 41-la-602 are received and filed with the
division within 30 days after the date the documents were executed, the
constructive notice datesfromthe time of the execution of the documents;
otherwise, constructive notice dates from the time of receipt andfilingof the
documents by the division as shown by its endorsement.
41-la-606. Method of giving notice - Exceptions.
The method provided in Sections 41-la-602 through 41-la-605, for giving
constructive notice of a lien or encumbrance upon a registered vehicle is exclusive
except for liens dependent upon possession and any lien or encumbrance filed as
provided under this chapter, which are exempt from the provisions of Section 70A9a-311, and other provisions of law that otherwise require or relate to the recording
or filing of instruments creating or evidencing title retention or other liens or
encumbrances upon vehicles of a type subject to registration under this chapter.
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72-9-603. Towing notice requirements - Cost responsibilities - Abandoned vehicle
title restrictions - Rules for maximum rates and certification.
(1) Except for tow truck service that was ordered by a peace officer, or a person
acting on behalf of a law enforcement agency, or a highway authority, as defined
in Section 72-1-102, after performing a tow truck service that is being done
without the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor owner's knowledge, the tow truck
operator or the tow truck motor carrier shall:
(a) immediately upon arriving at the place of storage or impound of the vehicle,
vessel, or outboard motor, contact the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction
over the area where the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor was picked up and
notify the agency of the:
(i) location of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor;
(ii) date, time, and location from which the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor was
removed;
(iii) reasons for the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor;
(iv) person who requested the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor;
and
(v) vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor's description, including its identification
number and license number or other identification number issued by a state
agency; and
(b) within two business days of performing the tow truck service, send a certified
letter to the last-known address of the registered owner and lien holder of the
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor obtained from the Motor Vehicle Division or if
the person has actual knowledge of the owner's address to the current address,
notifying him of the:
(i) location of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor;
(ii) date, time, location from which the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor was
removed;
(iii) reasons for the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor;
(iv) person who requested the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor;
(v) a description, including its identification number and license number or other
identification number issued by a state agency; and
(vi) costs and procedures to retrieve the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor.
(2) Until the tow truck operator or tow truck motor carrier reports the removal as
required under Subsection (l)(a), a tow truck motor carrier or impound yard may
not:
(a) collect any fee associated with the removal; and
(b) begin charging storage fees.
4

(3) The owner of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor lawfully removed is only
responsible for paying:
(a) the tow truck service and storage fees set in accordance with Subsection (7);
and
(b) the administrative impound fee set in Section 41-6a-1406, if applicable.
(4) The fees under Subsection (3) are a possessory lien on the vehicle, vessel, or
outboard motor until paid.
(5) A person may not request a transfer of title to an abandoned vehicle until at
least 30 days after notice has been sent under Subsection (l)(b).
(6) A tow truck motor carrier or impound yard shall clearly and conspicuously
post and disclose all its current fees and rates for tow truck service and storage of a
vehicle in accordance with rules established under Subsection (7).
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act, the Department of Transportation shall:
(a) set maximum rates that:
(i) tow truck motor carriers may charge for the tow truck service of a vehicle,
vessel, or outboard motor that are transported in response to:
(A) a peace officer dispatch call;
(B) a motor vehicle division call; and
(C) any other call where the owner of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor has
not consented to the removal; and
(ii) impound yards may charge for the storage of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard
motor stored as a result of one of the conditions listed under Subsection (7)(a)(i);
(b) establish authorized towing certification requirements, not in conflict with
federal law, related to incident safety, clean-up, and hazardous material handling;
and
(c) specify the form and content of the posting and disclosure of fees and rates
charged by a tow truck motor carrier or impound yard.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This case is an appeal from a summary judgment
granted by Judge Lewis of the Third District Court. The case originated as a
replevin action filed by the credit union, a lender, to recover its collateral for a
loan. The vehicle had been towed by Guy Remick doing business as Wasatch
5

Towing and was being held by Guy Remick who claimed a lien for towing and
storage on the vehicle, ihe credit union brougiit a replevin accion seeking
recovery of the vehicle. The Court Ordered Guy Remick to turn the vehicle over
to the credit union pending the outcome of the case. After ruling in favor of the
credit union on its Motion for Summary Judgment, the credit union ultimately
obtained a Court Order allowing it to sell the vehicle and apply the sale proceeds to
the loan balance.
RELEVANT FACTS
Granite Credit Union initially states its strong objection to the summary of
relevant facts stated by Guy Remick. Guy Remick in his Brief of Appellant sets
forth a number of what he claims to be facts but the assertions that he made were
not before the trial court and are not supported by the record. In addition, the
statements or facts are not supported by reference to the record as is required by
the rules. For these reasons, this Court should disregard the statement of facts set
forth by the Appellant, Guy Remick. The only facts that were before the trial court
were set forth in the First and Second affidavits of Thea Johnson, R. 15-20, 52-53.
A summary of undisputed facts taken from the affidavits and relevant documents is
set forth below.
Granite Credit Union (the "credit union") is a credit union located in Salt
Lake County, Utah. R. 1 PI. The credit union made a loan to Hernan Rosales on
6

June 4,2002. The loan was secured by a 1997 Plymouth Voyager, VIN.
2P4i^F253y VK21 /96L. ine loan was in the amount oi $D,DUU.VU anu wa;> ieqiweu
to be repaid at 5.5% interest with payments of $120.00 per month. R. 15 & 18.
The credit union's security interest was perfected by the credit union being listed
as a lienholder on the certificate of title. R. 8,16. The loan became delinquent and
the credit union began looking for the vehicle to repossess it. R. 15, 52. The credit
union was not able to locate the vehicle until the credit union received notice from
Guy Remick's place of business that the vehicle had been towed and was being
held by Mr. Remick. R. 52, 55, 56. On November 18, 2003, the credit union
received a fax from Guy Remick seeking fees for towing and storage in the amount
of $1,682.00. R. 53, 55. The credit union refused to pay for storage because the
credit union believed that it had not received timely notice of impound of the
vehicle. R. 53.
The credit union, through its attorney, contacted Defendant Guy Remick to
offer a settlement and indicate the credit union's position. No resolution was
reached from the communication of the parties. R. 53, 56, 57.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The dollar amount at issue in this case is not of great consequence to the
parties so much as the issues because of the recurring nature of the same fact
pattern. The issues presented in this appeal have not been fully addressed by prior
7

published decisions. Granite Credit Union urges this Court to affirm the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of the credit union for the following reasons.
First, Guy Remick failed to file any affidavits that support his factual
assertions. Because there was no evidence to support his claim that he had a lien
on the vehicle or had the right to obtain the title to the vehicle, his claim must fail.
Second, any claimed lien or right to a lien asserted by Guy Remick is
subordinate to the interests of Granite Credit Union. Granite Credit Union
properly perfected its security interest by complying with the relevant statutes
which resulted in constructive and actual notice to Guy Remick that the credit
union had a perfected security interest which took priority over Guy Remick's
claimed lien.
Third, Guy Remick failed to comply with the statute which would have
given him a lien by waiting more than 100 days to give notice to Granite Credit
Union when the statute required notice within two days.
Fourth, the trial court's Order did not articulate findings of fact and
conclusions of law but that is not a critical error in this case because Guy Remick
concedes that the facts are not disputed and there is ample evidence in the record to
support the Court's conclusion. In addition, this Court is obliged to affirm the trial
court's ruling on any available basis. For these reasons, the trial court's Order
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granting Granite Credit Union's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
affirmed in all respects.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT GUY REMICK FAILED TO
PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE THAT HE
HAS A RECOGNIZABLE LIEN IN THE
1997 PLYMOUTH VOYAGER.
In order to obtain a lien and begin charging storage and towing fees, a tow
truck operator must comply with Utah Code Ann. § 72-9-603 subparagraph (l)(a)
and (b). There was no evidence before the trial court that the Defendant complied
with any portions of the statute, including the proper notification of the parties and
whether performing a tow truck service was properly completed in accordance
with law.
Guy Remick further argues that he complied with all necessary requirements
to obtain a new title from the state. Again, these statements do not refer to the
record and have no evidentiary support. Guy Remick provides no information
regarding his compliance with any statute that would allow him to obtain a new
title.
Because there is no evidence before the Court that Defendant Guy Remick
complied with any of the prerequisites to obtaining a valid lien on the vehicle or a
9

new title, the trial court properly granted Granite Credit Union's Motion for
Summary Judgment allowing the credit union to sell the vehicle and apply tne sale
proceeds to the loan balance.
POINT H
GRANITE CREDIT UNION'S
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST
TAKES PRIORITY OVER ANY
POSSIBLE CLAIM OF GUY REMICK.
The undisputed facts do not establish that Guy Remick had a recognizable
lien in the 1997 Plymouth Voyager, However, even if a lien existed, the following
analysis will establish the credit union' s'perfected security interest takes priority
over any claimed lien of Guy Remick.
The perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle is addressed by Utah
Code Ann. §41-la-601 through 606. It is undisputed that the credit union
complied with those provisions and had a perfected security interest in the 1997
Plymouth Voyager that is the subject of this action at the time that the vehicle was
towed and stored by Guy Remick. See copy of title certificate at R. 8. Section 41la-604 states that:
The filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title
under Sections 41-la-602 and 41-la-603 constitute
constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against
the vehicle, vessel, and outboard motor to creditors of the
owner and to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.
10

Guy Remick was a creditor of the owner and/or a subsequent encumbrancer.
He had constructive notice of the credit union's lien because the corrected title was
issued on August 1,2002, long before the vehicle was towed.
Section 41-la-601(l) states the following with respect to priority of liens in motor
vehicles:
Except as provided under Subsection (2), a lien upon a
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor, except a lien
dependent upon possession, is not valid against the
creditors of an owner acquiring a lien by levy or
attachment, or subsequent purchasers, or encumbrancers
without notice until Sections 41-la-602 through 41-la606 have been complied with.
Guy Remick claims a lien in the vehicle pursuant to section 72-9-603(4).
That section states that "[t]he fees under Subsection (3) are a possessory lien on the
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor until paid."

However, the plain language of

Section 41-la-601 makes it clear that a perfected security interest takes priority
over the type of lien claimed by Guy Remick who is a subsequent encumbrancer
through his claim of a storage and towing lien.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that a creditor who failed to
comply with the lien-filing requirements (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-601 through
606) had an unperfected security interest that was inferior to a subsequent
purchaser who received an unencumbered title. Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co..
770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988). In this case, however, the credit union has complied
11

with allfilingrequirements which gave not only constructive notice but also actual
notice to Guy Remick that the credit union had a superior interest in the vehicle.
The priority of liens on personal property is also dealt with at Utah Code
Ann. § 38-2-3. That section states:
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow
labor upon, any article of personal property at the request
of the owner or other person entitled to possession
thereof shall have a lien upon such article for the
reasonable value of the labor performed and materials
furnished and used in making such article or in altering
or repairing the same, and may retain possession thereof
until the amount so due is paid; provided such lien and
right to possession shall be subject and subordinate to the
rights and interests of any secured parties in such
personal property unless such secured party has requested
such person to make, alter or repair or bestow labor upon
such property.
The statute may also apply in this case because the Defendant is claiming a
lien for the towing and storage of the vehicle. This statute is also consistent with
Section 41-la-601 because of the rule that a perfected security interest takes
priority over a lien of the type claimed by Guy Remick absent consent of the
secured party.
The credit union did not authorize any towing or storage. Therefore, the
credit union's valid perfected security interest takes priority over Guy Remick's
lien. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the summary judgment granted by
the trial court.
12

POINT III
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED
TO RECOVER TOWING OR STORAGE
FEES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
NOTICE STATUTES.
Section 72-9-603 sets out the obligations of the tow truck operator with
respect to towing of an abandoned vehicle. The tow truck operator is required to
immediately contact the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the area
where the vehicle was picked up and provide the law enforcement agency
information about the identification of the vehicle, reason for its removal, the
location from where the vehicle was towed, where the vehicle is located now, and
at whose request the vehicle was removed.
In addition, the statute requires that "within two business days of performing
the tow truck service, send a certified letter to the last known address of the
registered owner and Henholder of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor obtained
from the motor vehicle division or if the person had actual knowledge of the
owner's address..." Utah Code Ann. § 72-9-603(b).
In this case, Guy Remick claims without supporting evidence that the towing
was completed on August 4, 2003. Assuming this statement is accurate, Guy
Remick had until August 6,2003 to notify the credit union who was the registered
Henholder of the vehicle, that the towing had occurred so the credit union can take
13

appropriate action. However, Guy Remick failed to comply with that provision
and did not send notice of the tow until November 20,2003, by his own admission
more than 100 days after the towing of the vehicle.
The obvious intent of the statute is that early notice be given to the owner
and lienholder so that all parties can protect their rights as soon as possible before
exorbitant storage charges are incurred. In this case, even though Guy Remick
failed to give the credit union notice of the tow until more than 100 days following
the tow service, he still wanted to charge the credit union for more than 100 days
of storage fees. Guy Remick cannot benefit from his dilatory notice. To allow him
to charge storage even though no notice had been timely provided would promote
disobedience to the law in the hope of incurring large storage bills. Charging the
storage fees without giving proper notice is clearly against the plain language of
the statute.
Utah Courts have refused to allow a party the benefit of a lien when that
party has failed to comply with the statutory requirements. See A.K.&R. Whipple
Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 1999 UT App 87; 977 P.2d 518 P40
(denying the plumbing company a mechanic's lien because of its failure to comply
with a licensing requirement).
Because the Defendant failed to properly and timely notify the credit union
regarding the towing and storage fees, Guy Remick is prohibited from asserting a
14

lien that takes priority over the credit union's perfected security interest. Summary
Judgment in favor of the credit union was properly granted by the trial court.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S LACK OF
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS DO
NOT REQUIRE A REMAND.
Guy Remick argues that the trial court made no findings of fact or
conclusions of law nor did itfindthat there were issues as to any material fact.
This argument does not benefit Guy Remick's position. Guy Remick concedes
that the facts before the Court were undisputed. The only facts before the Court
were set forth in the two Affidavits of Thea Johnson. Findings of fact were not
required by the trial court because there was no dispute regarding what the facts
were. In addition, the trial court made sufficient rulings on the record to determine
what the basis for her decision was. For example, on page 18 of the transcript, the
Court makes the following statement:
It sounds to me like there is clear
subordination here. It sounds to me like
you've got the priority interest without
question. R. 141, Tr. at 18: 17-19.
The Court further makes the statement that:
He may well be owed the money by the
person who took out the loan, or the
underlying debtor, but he subordinated and
he didn't send out notice promptly.
R. 141, Tr. at 21:20-22.
15

While the Court entertained some of the arguments and representations of
counsel for Mr. Remick, she ultimately determined that the assertions were "not
supported by affidavit or any other document." R. 141, Tr. at 22: 14-15. The
Court ultimately found as follows:
I find that the interest of Wasatch Towing is
subordinated to the issue of Granite Credit
Union. R. 141, Tr. at 25:10-11.
Based upon the foregoing support in the record, the trial court made no error in its
findings and conclusions that the interest of Guy Remick was subordinated to
Granite Credit Union.
In addition, this Court has an "obligation to affirm the trial court on any
available basis..." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen
Construction, 1999 UT App 87; 977 P.2d 518, P15. As set forth above, there are
ample reasons for this Court to affirm the trial court's decision. The trial court's
decision was correct for several reasons, each of which have been articulated
above. Therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate in
all respects and should be affirmed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the credit union has a superior lien to any lien of
Guy Remick. In addition, Guy Remick failed to give proper notice of the towing
and storage fees to the credit union and thereby should be prohibited from asserting
16

any lien that would take priority over the credit union's perfected security interest.
The credit union was entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the summary judgment granted
by the trial court in all respects.
Dated this ]<*__ day of September, 2005.
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES

Dean A. Stuart
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy the Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment to:
Daniel Virgil Irvin
Daniel V. Irvin, LLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 206
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
this /ff

day of September, 2005; postage prepaid.
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